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-1ntroductionResponsibility has taken on several connotations throughout various times and in various
fields. Any sort of study into responsibility will have to first declare a meaning for the term that it
wishes to use, and then build from this point. Responsibility is, in the context of this paper, the
relationship between an agent and an event which the agent brought about. Responsibility is the
degree with which an event was brought into being by the intentions and the actions of the agent.
It will be required that we begin focusing on a single event and a single agent and later we will
examine the aspects which are derived from expanding to include a larger scale.
My first step is to find the basic parts of responsibility. Having divided responsibility into
these parts, I will proceed to study how they will work together and form the whole. Finally, I
will try and examine how the differences between these different parts lead to different outcomes.
Different values in will result in different values out.
The agent has a "self' which can act upon the agent's "world" (the latter will be referred
often to as 'World" in this paper, and the former as simply "Agent") after (and occasionally
before) making plans and thinking about what these might entail for the World. It is in this
connection between the Agent and the World that we see responsibility as defined above. The
Agent is not in full control over the World, though it is arguable that the Agent might control
some part. The Agent is also not free of the pull of the world, though it is arguable that the agent
might be able to make a pure decision without being bogged down by the influence of the World
at all time. These two assum~ionsare going to be fairly key to the majority of the first part,
unless 1 wish to be bogged down in multiple assessments of value on all sides, unable to come up
with any general statement without a dozen counterstatements being immediately brought to
mind.
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In the interface of Agent and World, I will set forth three "qualities" (as opposed to

quantities, these are not meant to be precise measurements but more along the lines of general
4

categories of things): Will, Cognition and Force. I will then move on to say that these are subfactors of the generally agreed upon tenets of responsibility: Intention and Action. Moral and
Legal responsibilities are outcomes of this division into two major aspects of responsibility.
Throughout the paper, I will use two main examples, one of which will be revisted
several times to demonstrate how important the "internal" notions of intention and cognition are
to coming up with a true sense of responsibility. These examples will lay out some guidelines,
and will aid in future subject of this topic.
It is my conclusion that responsibility as we know it requires the Will of the Agent (a
term that I will describe in better detail later). For responsibility to exist, the Agent must have a
self and a World with which the Agent is free to have ideas about and free to act upon. If the
Agent is not free to think about the event, the the Agent is made to take up the event in his mind.
If the Agent is not free to act upon the event, then the Agent is made to take up the event with his
hands (this term is used on arbitrarily, most events fall outside the use of hands, I admit). One can
be said to be determinedly responsible for events they did not will into being, much like a ball can
be said to have knocked over a figurine on a shelf, but that is a form of responsibility not attended
to in this paper. It would be best left to Theologians and Physicists who are concerned with a
determined universe. Responsibility is ultimately a factor of Will.

-Assumptions and the AgentResponsibility is linkd to an Agent. This is first and foremost the main axiom I will
adopt, by which I mean that the idea of asking "Who is responsible?" entails the idea of someone
bringing the action into being; and the question "Is this person responsible?" judging the
responsibility of a particular Agent. These are the two basic questionsphich the model of this
paper are meant to address. Agent will be henceforth understood to be-,a human (terrastially
biased as I am) who has, as stated before, the mental and physical capacity to make plans and to
4

act upon the World. This is a limited version of the Agent, which could also be expanded to
include animal or other nonhuman intelligences, though I will not need to do so at this time.
The Agent is not some mere mind and Will which interacts with the world through a
pineal gland of convenience, but a viable being in the World capable of creating change and
making ideas as to what this change means. The Agent is part of nature, but one which can
influence the nature which influences him. Change of the World is an important thing to this
paper, for not only is an Agent a being who is capable of changing the world, but an event is
recognized as a change in the World.
This brings about a trinity of three key terms and three key assumptions that deal with
responsibility. There is a World in which events take place and in which an Agent can exist.
There is an Agent which exists and can bring about changes in the World. There are events which
constitute the change of the World and are meaningfd entities. It is also assumed that the World
is more complex than this paper can possibly address in its length, and that the Agent is a part of
the World and therefore can be acted upon by events as well as create events, but due to the need
of staying focused we will leave these aspects for krther study.
The last of the basic assumptions is that responsibility will be examined as a translatable,
rational concept. In other words, I am able to discuss it and put it into terms that someone else
may understand. I am wanting to avoid the idea that responsibility is somehow trapped inside of a
private, mental language out of which no generalizations can be made and constant relativisims
erupts. This is, like the curren~definitionof Agent, a limiting concept which sort of makes one
stick with a certain number of humans, but it enables the ground work to be set out and it is then
only a factor of adjusting this basic idea to fit these increasingly complex models.
.#*

-_

-The Three Qualities DefinedResponsibility is the relationship between the Agent and the event. This can be expanded
as a definition to be defined as the relationship between the Agent and the change which the
Agent created in the World. This definition reaches somewhat of a limit when it comes in contact
with mental thoughts. These create no change in the World outside of the Agent, and therefore
they are not events in the way this paper is looking at them. But, I will hold that these are mental
actions (we shall distinguish these as "non-World actions" or thoughts from 'World actions", the
latter which will be referred to as simply "actions" later, as opposed to "non-World actions")
which are intertwined with the Cognition and Will portions of responsibility.
The Agent and the World have an divisionary interface which is neither artificially
constructed (i.e. illusory) nor absolute. The Agent has the ability to distinguish between a selfaware entity and the World, but at the same time the Agent can easily recognize his or her ability
to do things, lest the Agent succumb to an inactivity of doing nothing. This paper will take the
stance of looking at the as being the cause, so it will stay focused on the qualities in light of this.
The first of the qualities is the Agent's awareness of the self and the Agent's ability to
have wants and needs. It is a factor of knowing the self, and a factor of controlling the self. It is
the factor which deals with the Agent having some goal in front of him or her, and having a sort
of dedication towards reaching the goal. This goal may be a shared goal, or a goal which
originates due to hunger or due to someone's suggestion, but it is involved in the Agent's idea of
what he or she is and what existing means and what is required to keep to this self-identity. This
first quality is the Will of the agent.
I want (and for class credit, need) to write this paper. This is the portion of paper which is
part of my Will. This involves ideas of me as a philosophy major and as a soon-to-graduate
student and as a honor's student. This also involves ideas of me taking into -consideration how a

paper like this is part of who I am.This involves in a knowing of this paper as being an event that
is caused by me.
Since Will is part of having a degree of control over the self, Will takes on a second
meaning. In certain aspects, Will becomes a degree of freedom which the Agent has. Agents are
free in some ways, and often not free in others (if I want to graduate with honors, this paper is
part of it, I am free to choose not to graduate with honors but I cannot claim both the ability to
graduate with honors and the ability to not write this paper). In this light, I am not perfectly free
in writing this paper. Another aspect of this is that I must write this paper which certain
qualifications in mind. This example of me writing this paper is a facet of the fact that I have to
write it both to make sense to me and to make sense to a reader. I cannot say to be perfectly free
willed in the construction of this paper.
The second quality has to do with how the Agent understands and knows the World
outside of the self. This is Cognition. In order for the Agent to know some part of the World, it
often has to be translated into something which fits into a current world view. In other words, the
Agent must put the World in terms already contained in the self. Until I know that something is
food, it is meaningless for me to look at h i t and think "It will quench my hunger." Inside my
self is a complex set of memories and tastes and preferences. It is through this complex network
that I am able to add new knowledge and make new plans. Surely, some of this "knowledge" is
actually more "instinct" or "procedure", but I am taking a more general statement of it right now.
As I taste the new fruit, it gets4dded into the complex network. Before I taste it, I understand its
value based on past experiences. The Agent's self is constantly changing in this way as it learns
new things and gets a better grasp as to what some things entail. For instance, though many
would say I am the same Doug Bolden that I was five years ago, the drrent self

includes

agreater knowledge of Kant and Hegel. I am currently engaged. I now u'nderstand the World

differently becomes terms of the World that effect me and are translatable into my self are
different than the ways they used to be.
Again, let us look at this paper. I have to understand the ideas of responsibility. This is
especially poignant in that I would not want to formulate an idea of responsibility that I inherently
disagree with. On the more practical side, I have to take in the fact that in order to write this paper
will take so much of my time, will require so many appointments with my adviser, Dr. Heikes,
will require so many hours of reading and will accomplish certain goals. Without this idea of how
the paper is linked to myself, I would be unable to proceed to the act of actually writing it. It
would be merely an unattainable goal for me.
Force is the third quality. It details the ability of the Agent to influence the World. This is
not necessarily the ability to overpower or break down the World, but an ability to alter it. It is
not required that I completely lift something and throw it. I might simply give it a nudge in the
power direction. Maybe I just tug on something and then it goes through a procedure.
The degree to which the Agent can modify the World is specifically referring to the
section of the World which the Agent is focused upon. In other words, if the question "Did this
person have the ability to do this?" is asked, it is the small section involved that is concerned.
This is not a statement of how much the Agent can effect the entirety of the World. This how
much the Agent can push over that particular bookcase, or how much the person can actually do
to steer a car into a driveway. In both cases, the person affected only an infinitesimal portion of
the whole of the World, but iffthe given events it might have been the only part of the World
which can be considered important.
An interesting note here, the World comes with certain physical laws: gravity, entropy,

conservations. When I use the term Force, I am not implying that the person has the power to
freely act outside of any given law here. The notion of Force currently includes these given laws

which effect all Agents. If some Agents have the ability to break out of certain laws, then they are
not truly laws and they can be considered while thinking about an Agent's Force.
Going back to the idea of me writing this paper, Force is my ability to get it down and
write it out. It is my ability to access a keyboard, to interface with the computer, to speak in
words that have meaning instead of some gibberish.
Force is not some separate entity from Will and Cognition, and none of these qualities are
floating in a void of the other two. In fact, they are all interlaced here. For me to have the power
over the keyboard is for me to have power over my fingers to type. For me to have the ability to
use words requires me to know which words mean what and to come up with an idea how to
properly use them. These qualities are only separated for descriptive simplicity, and like any
physical characteristic it must ultimately maintained that these are not distinct entities but parts of
the whole which are abstracted. In application, they must be maintained as part of this whole in
order for them to make any sense.

-Intention and ActionThe three qualities make up the the two aspects of responsibility. Will is part of both
aspects, though in slightly different ways. Then, along with Will, the others-in

turn-make

up

the two aspects. This is something that will be simpler to just describe than just state.
Will is in part the understanding of the self, of having motivations and desires for the self
and being to understand what'these desires might mean as fkr as the actions of the self are
concerned. This combines with Cognition to include an understanding of the World. The self is
not a contained, separated entities. There are desires, biological and otherwise, which lie outside
of it at least in part. One wanting a sandwich has to make it out of things .hot wholly contained by
the self, unless one appeals to some strange horror story. In this light,the self requires the
Cognition of the World in order to understand how to bring about these events so that it may
a

serve itself. This combination of understandings what the self desires and what the World can do
to bring about the Agent's desires is the Intention of the Agent. Intention requires both the Will
and the Cognition to function fully, thought it is reasonable to say that an Agent might not fully
understand the World to Intend "I need food." and an Agent might be working on some
subconscious level when they do some action. This would imply the Intention is not pure in the
sense it is used in this paper. The Agent might Intend to eat food but not have an Intention to eat a
particular food. Then the question comes out if the Agent's Intention to eat food is in question or
the Intention to eat that food. Another aspect is when one takes into mind risks. An Agent might
not intend to lose control of the car, but if their car control was lost because they were doing
90mph on a rainy day (or at all), then the Agent is somewhat responsible since the Intention to be
a safe driver entails certain reasonable actions.
Again, let us return to my writing of this paper. I am Intending to write this paper. This is
in part graduation requirements, and in part a personal interest. My Intention in the sense of this
paper is my ability to understand myself, and what this paper entails. It is my ability to come to
an understanding as to what this paper will require, and to how to best word things.
Will is also part having control over the self. The self can be lead to create and influence
certain situations. It is important for the Agent to have proper Will in order to have proper Force.
Force is the ability to influence the World. Will is required so that the self may inact this Force.
The self is the primary tool of the Agent, all other tools being initially influenced by the Agent's
self. These two qualities are p&t of the make up Action. Like Intention, the Action of an agent is
an aspect which lies between two qualities. Will and Force are required for an Agent to bring
about Action in the sense it is implied here, which does not focus on the qualities of the action
itself but of the Agent's connection to the action.

r

In writing this paper, for example, my Action is my ability to type2to speak and write in
English, my ability to take time to write the paper, my ability to be the person at this keyboard as
I

opposed to anyone else. If I did not have the time to bring about the paper, or if the paper was
written in part by someone else or maybe if the paper was something that I could only type
certain letters of (say, due to a broken keyboard) then I would not be able to say have pure Action
over the writing of this paper.
Like the three qualities, the two aspects are not separate from one another. They involve
each other in their form. Action is not wholly separate from Intention. For one, having Intentions
is an action in itself. Also, having Action often involves a constantly changing sense of Intention.
When one decides to drive to the store, there are many moments when they have to swerve
around other cars, or think about how much money they are spending. It is a constant interface
between the Intention and the Action with the two things influencing each other in a real world
scenario.

-A Table to Compare Qualities and Aspects-

Agent's Ability to

Which Qualities

Which
Aspect

Understanding

Will (Self) and Cognition (World)

Intention

Control

Will (Self) and Force (World)

Action

-The Model of ResponsibilityI propose the following model for the understanding of responsibility: Responsibility, R,
is proportional to the relationship between the degree of the quality of Will in turn with each the
qualities of cognition and force. This can be represented with the approximation:

R approximates {(qW * qC)

+ (qW * qF)Y

-.

Taking in the aspects o f responsibility, w e now can use the above approximation and can
alter it t o a new form, namely:

R approximates {(I) + (A)).
These two approximations gives us an idea of how responsibility works in this paper.*
Will, cognition, and force (qW, qC and qF, respectively) are meant to be expressed in
qualitative terms not quantitatively. If one of the qualities is filly present (for example, if a
person is perfectly able to understand the situation) then the value of the quality is complete. On
the other end of the spectrum is when a quality is devoid from the situation (for example, a person
has no understanding of the situation in the least). Then the quality is absent. Between "complete"

and "absent" (or "going to zero) lies a spectrum of incompleteness ranging from mostly
incompletely to mostly complete. If one was so inclined, a scale of 0 being absent and 1 being
complete could be used to express the above approximation.
The quasi-mathematical structure of the above approximations are used is to express the
qualities overall relationship as this paper holds it forth. If one possibly has as complete a value in
all the factors as they might possibly have, then they are as responsible as they may be for the
given event. This sort of wording is used because it is questionable as to how much pure control
and understanding the Agent can have on an action. As either Cognition or Force begin to drop
towards being absent, then the value of one side (the two "classic" sides being Moral (based on
Intention) and Legal (based on Action)) drops at the same ratio down to a zero value, causing that

.*

side to decrease. This means that R becomes a smaller and smaller number. Yet, as long as there
is at least some Cognition and some Force, the value is not a null value.

' ~ a k careful
e
note that the plus signs and the multiplications signs are not implfing that the factors are
added or multiplied. Instead, the implication here is to show how they work together. Much like
addition, those joined by "+" are separate but the whole requires both. As one changes, the other one
stays the same and the whole changes in an equal amount. Therefore, one can go to zero, but have the
whole equal to a nonzero value. Much like multiplication, the "*" denotes that the value of the whole is
related by the factor of the individual cjmge. As one part goes to zero, so does the whole. Both parts
are required to be some nonzero value before the whole can be a nonzero value.

If Cognition goes to absent, then the event's Intention goes to zero and the event becomes
Accidental. If Force goes to zero, then the event's Action goes to zero and the event becomes
Imaginary.
If the Cognition and the Force both reach zero, then this means that the event was neither
thought up nor acted upon. This makes the overall value of R fall to zero. More importantly, as
Will goes to zero, both the Agent's Intention and the Agent's Action will decrease to nothing.
Eventually, the value of R will again be completely absent from the event. At this point in time,
the event becomes Fated.
An example besides this paper would be good. James is a construction worker nearing the
end of his standard eight hour work day. His job normally requires him, at this time, to use the
company fork lift and to carry the tools back into the warehouse. Today, he decides to cut across
from his normal path and speed up the time it will take him. He is aware of the fact that this is
against safety precautions, but he is bored and wants to go home. He is well trained in operations
and the forklift works fine. The day is sunny, and the ground is not slick at all. While doing this,
he catches his coworker, Raymond, off guard and slams into him, crushing his Raymond's leg.
How does the model address this behavior? How responsible is James for breaking Raymond's
leg?
At this stage, the model can give us some basic descriptors of the situation. There is no
reason to think of James as being anything but in full control of his mind and body. Though he
might be somewhat tired after-llis day of work, it was mainly boredom that caused him to change
his course from the safe one. He was perfectly able to take the slightly longer and safer route.
James' will over this event is complete. James' force is also complete. His ability to drive the
forklift was not impeded by malfunction of the forklift or by any sort oF"'oad conditions7'. This
puts James as being complete in action (the model will show more complexity to this later,
though, at this point a beginning of the discussion is contained in the Appendix). Cognition,
I

however, is not complete in that James did not make plans to hurt Raymond, merely to cut a few
minutes off of his work day. James could see the possibility of violating safety procedure
resulting in such accidents, but he did not have the urge to bring about Raymond's broken leg.
James has performed the Action necessary to bring this event to existence. He has manipulated
the World in the ways necessary in order for this even to be brought about. He has not understood
the the World with the idea of performing this accident. The only aspect of Intention that lies
within James' grasp is that he has decided to violate safety precautions despite the knowing of
them. In this way, the Intention towards committing the act is not completely in the favor of
James. This event is largely accidental, but it must be noted that James did not intend to do the
proper thing either. It is negligent at best.

-The Conclusions of the PaperThis paper concludes with two findings. The first finding is that the qualities and the
aspects of responsibilities are going to have to take a combined approach. One will not be able to
locate responsibility as a product of a single unit, but some combination of many factors. As
noted in the first of the three appendices, most approaches focus on a weighted approach. It is
possible that these weighted approaches merely cloud the issue and make it harder to understand.
The most important finding is that responsibility is directly linked to the Will of the
Agent. This is only one definition of responsibility, albeit, but the holding here is that the key
relationship between the Age& and the event is the degree to which the the Agent willed the
event into being. If one denies the Agent's ability to Will an event, then you deal with a merely
efficient cause at the hands of some greater Agent (or no Agent at all besides physical law) and
you have two events, not an Agent and an event. For the two to be separqte, requires Will.

-.

-Appendix One: Moral versus Legal ~es~onsibility-'
An accident does not necessarily remove James from responsibility of striking Raymond
in the example from the main paper. At the same time, the question stands as to whether James

can be held responsible for Raymond's crushed leg without intention. The physical reality
remains. The intentionality is still absent. Where does this solution stand?
The major division that has historically been the case for responsibility has been between
a legal paradigm focused on action and a moral paradigm focused on intention. It is somewhat
more interesting in my opinion to deal with questions of intention, but some few short paragraphs
will be taken to distinguish between both the systems briefly.
Legal responsibility is responsibility that focuses on the Action with the aftermath of the
event (the event itself as well as its outcomes) as being the large indicator of what is the truth of
the matter. There are many practical reasons for focusing on the Agent's actions as opposed to
intentions. You have a distinct "something" you can point at, and in a lot of cases you can write a
set number of laws which handle the events based on their description. A drawback to this
method is that there might not a proper handling of the Agent's Intention. If one's immediate
response to an action (as opposed to Action) is look merely at the witnessable effects, then you
might praise someone for greedy mechanisms and you might punish someone for a noble
inclination. Human action is often filled with color. Three men can each say the words "I love
you" but one can be talking to a wife, another to a child, and the third could be talking to his car.
The internal dialog that propels the words into the world is of rich importance. This is why
personal vision of not only the event but of the entire World is very important when coming to an
understanding of what was meant to happen, a set of three physical actions might be entirely
different in their purpose.

r

Moral responsibility focuses on intention, instead of action. As could be guessed, it will
1

This appendix focuses on the standard distinction between the importance of Intention and Action. It was
origrnally a part of the main paper but was brought down here in that it was unnecessary for the
conclusion, though an interesting discission of how the model often fits to the real world.

not be necessarily easy to look at in a empirical manner. It is not impossible to tell a person
intentions, but it does tend to be a path of least resistance to go to the legal side of the equation.
Yet, by focusing on the moral side of responsibility, we put the focus on Agent's changing that
which they have the most access to: themselves. The World might somehow has a good deal of
resistance sometimes, so an action may be greatly retarded by actions not of the agent's choosing.
When you focus on moral responsibility, though, you have the agent plans captured even before
they have a chance to be resisted by the world.
The balance between action and intention is not necessarily easy to sum up in two broad
terms. One version of moral responsibility may totally ignore action, while another might actually
count a good deal of action just focus more on the intention. There is also responsibility like
currently held in America. Intention and action are both important. Due to the structuring of the
American judicial system, which one is most important is often decided on a case by cases basis.
For lack of a better term, this type of system that neither favors intention nor action shall be
called "Full Responsibility".

-Appendix Two: Questions of ~ntention-2
1)The Question of Accidents. If an accident is defined as event that has action but not

intention, what good will it do to address accidents in a section dedicated to moral philosophy?
Well, the question here has to do with a term brought up above: negligence. Negligence (as I
define it) is the moral obligation to have an intention but failing to act upon it. James, above,
should have had the intention to keep his coworkers safe. By not having this intention, he was
negligent. Had he kept safety in mind, the accident most likely would not have happened
(assuming, of course, that Raymond did not have the bad luck to be walking where HE was not
supposed to).

2) What Does Prevention Mean? Prevention is an interesting term. It refers to stopping
something from taking place. If one acts upon a preventive measure, they do act, but the major
"event" which occurs is an absence of an event that could be expected. Prevention, as a study, is a
host to all sort of questions. If an agent can act to prevent an event but does not, does the agent
take responsibility for the event or does the fall outside of the agent's control? As far as my model
is concerned, prevention will be about as grey an area as can be found. Since responsibility is the
degree which a change in the world is influenced, then the "legal" answer is that the agent is not
responsible unless there is some reason (such as obligations) that the agent should have prevented
it. On the moral side, however, if the agent had some sort idea of the way that the world should be
influenced yet did not act to prevent the event which changes this view, then at least some
imaginary event took place (imaginary in the sense of non-action) and at least an amount of
reponsibility is shared. Of course, further study into group dynamic is greatly needed but not
quite ready to be addressed to fully look at this issue.
3) States of Mind. Let us return to James and his forklift for theFime being. James in the

original example was merely bored, and possibly a little tired. What if James had been wanting to
ZThis appendix was also originally designed as part of the original paper, but its presence is more of an
interesting use of the further examination of the model rather than anything which can be used to say
anythmg precisely at this point in time. "

rush home because his wife was about to give birth to their first son? What if James was sick and
partly out of it due to fever? What if James had been told that he had only more day to work and
at the end of the day, after parking the forklift, he was fired? How does these various levels of
agitation affect James' responsibility?
Intention is composed of the understanding of the self, and the understanding of the
world, as directed towards the fulfillment of some event the agent brings about. This event was
already noted as being an accident, and without intention, so how does this change the outcome?

In the case of James, it will still largely lead to a case of negligence. With the aspect of him being
sick or his wife giving birth, it may also involve coworkers who let him use large machinery in
his state of mind.
Let us say that instead of running over Raymond, James gets to the main warehouse
uneventfully and finds the main door closed. It would take him twenty minutes to get someone to
open it, and for one of the various reasons he does not have time. He knows that it will most
likely rain within a few minutes, and the tools may get damaged by being left out in the elements.
If James leaves the tools out in the elements, he is fully aware of the damage he will cause. Now,
because he is out of time, feeling sick, or angry, he does leave the tools out. How does the model
address these questions? The "firing of James" scenario ending up with the tools left out is James'
full responsibility. He was angry, yes, but this is in no way truly impeded him from doing his job,
which was still his job before he was terminated on completion. The case of the wife about to
give birth is a weighted decisidn for James. His job has importance. So does the birth of this son.
James would have to decide which is more important, being unable to fulfill both desires. The
desire to see his son born wins out, which is not necessarily irresponsible of James. Neverthless,
the agent knew of the consequence of this choice. The re~ponsibility~ls
muted because of the
scarcity of James' time and his inability to do both, but it still lingers. Sickness, though, will
probably come down to James' being out of mind and therefore not as willed as he should have
I

been. This means that intention drops since James was not hlly understanding what James
wanted, besides on the more biological level of getting to rest.

4) The Agent's World View. What if James simply does not care if anyone gets hurt,
and that the safety of others is something that has no truth? What if Raymond, in his view, was
simply not important enough to think about when choosing not to take the safety route. In the
world view of James, not even negligence is applicable. To the world view of others, it would be,
if not something more sinister. This is a question that will largely have to do with group dynamic,
specifically when a personal world view interacts with society as a whole. The model at present
does not offer emphasis on world view of society or world view of the individual. In this case,
James' is reponsible to those who think that James should have paid attention. James would not
consider himself responsible.
5) Intentional Accident? For the last question, let us tweak the model one more time.

Let us say that James has caught Raymond having an affair with his wife. James has obsessed
with hurting Raymond in some way. On the day in question, though, James had no intention of
specifically hurting Raymond with the forklift. Can you have an intention for some class of event
but not for a specific event? Is it an accident, or an intentional event, when such occurs? The
model will not hold James more than accidently responsible. The idea of hurting Raymond being
an intention

has included in it an ability to express the world in terms of the self in order

toactualize it. Since James was not planning to use the forklift to hurt Raymond, not even aware
of Raymond at all in this c&e, then his want to do so in other ways does not make him
intentionally responsible for the act.

-Appendix Three: Event Field and Event Distance
1. The Proposal of Event Field

The paper until now has mainly dealt with the idea of a single Agent and a single event,
something necessary in the view of simplification so that some basis could be laid. The idea of an
event isolated so that it exists in nihil and is related to no other event is an irrational one. In fact,
for an event to have meaning, it must interact with other events. If not, it means something only
to itself. Events as this paper handles them, namely as the product of an Agent, do not exist in
singularity, they are parts in a series. Events create events. Events come out of events and they
create them. Any study of responsibility will have to make note of this fact.
This final study of this paper will be to discuss briefly how the idea of a 'World filled
with events" has any effect on our investigation up until this point. The eating of food, for
instance, is a fairly complex activity that involves both voluntary and involuntary actions, social
construction as to what etiquette means, and often involves the idea of several Agents (i.e. cook,
patron, guests, the person who cleans up, farmers which grew the food). Eating might have
several purposes: to cure hunger, to socialize, to try some new delicacy, to appease a relative, to
celebrate an occasion, or to worship some deity. To try and localize eating as a simple event is to
detract from the fullness of its meaning. Eating becomes most truly meaningful when one looks at
it as a way to have energy to hunt the following morning or a way to get to know one's boss
better.
This complex lattice id which events exist can be broken down much in the same way
that time and space can be broken down into intervals of some time and some space. This "some

amount ofevents is an event field. Event field theory is a tool which can expand upon the notion
"

of event and the subset this paper specifically looks: responsible events. I[t gives a tool that allows
one to examine how a interlaced set of events and agents can, together,--betaken so as some
3

This is the most important of the three appendices, and so I end with it. It is the one which I plan to take up
in future study.
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amount of detail can be made known. One way of understanding it is such: a person shooting
another person in the head is technically only possible if the victim has done something to bring
himself to said spot. How much does the killer play in the role and how much does the victim?
Event fields are a way to sort out such questions so that some answer can be reached.
Event field can be described in simple terms as the collection of events that have
something to do with each other, connected both in the sense of being causally related as both
progenitors and descendants of each other but also related in the psychological sense of the
human mind contemplating them as one. Think of the domino effect as a good primary and
simple event field. The one domino causes the next one to fall over and so and so on and
eventually these dominoes might run out or maybe they will "trigger" some other event (like the
audience clapping if it is a competition). This given domino event field does not have to subsist
only of the dominoes and their falling. It can also be expanded so that in the domino event field is
the idea that someone had to set up the dominoes, and this can be taken back with all the possible
complications it brings into play (birth, life choices, etc).
Must event A necessarily follow event B? Must the domino fall once pushed the domino
before it? There are two basic answers to this that fit our general model of the way that the world
works: namely "yes" and "maybe". The unspoken "no" leads to a series of free causes in which
there is no order, assuming there is not some higher power acting as a constant event A to a series
of events B in which case leads to a branching version of "yes" or "maybe". To the possibility of
LLyes",it is a postulation t h a t h y physical event follows from a set of laws with govern it and
therefore it will set into motion the actions that are to become the next event, again governed by
laws. The logical outcome of this, assuming one does not postulate a difference between the
electrons outside and the electrons inside the human body, is that ,the universe becomes a
succession of necessity. We come to a fated universe, in which will-degrades to zero and
responsibility-as

expressed in terms of the paper-becomes
I

nil. Since this outcome negates the

rational discussion of responsibility besides as an assignment of predestiny, it will be only in the
second case, the "maybe" that will be of interest to us.

In the case of "maybe", we have before us a chance that event A will lead to event B.
This is an escape from physical hyperdetermism which somewhat follows the quantum model of
a probabilistic universe. More importantly to the model of responsibility this paper puts forth, this
is the form which physical law occurs to the human mind. If you bring something to bear on the
world, there is a chance it will have the outcome you want it to have and there is a chance that
you will accidentally trigger something else. Even in the case of the highest degree of certainty,
there is an underlying knowing that the gun might backfire, or that the brakes to ones car might
fail. We come up with a practical way of looking at the physical world that models how we
approach, a world of general guidelines but still a little capricious at the same time. No matter
how many times the experiment is repeated, there will always be some percent error unless one
gets lucky.

2. Event Distance
Much like space can be quantified by distance and time by duration, event fields are
quantifiable with "event distance". Even distance refers to "number of subsequent events from
event A to event B" much in the way that distance is "amount of space between point A and point
B". Back to using the dominoes, the idea of event distance becomes exemplified with the idea
that every domino knocks over the next domino. If you have a collection of a dozen dominoes
then you have at least ten dominoes that must fall after the first is pushed and the before the last
one gets hit.
In less simplified terms, event distance is the amount of successive changes that an agent

has to create in an event field to lead up to the event being studied. Emip throws a hard ball into
a bulls-eye, trigger a mechanism, and dunking some poor sitting clown into water. In this case,
the throwing of the ball can be construed as one event, the striking of the bullseye could be
I

another event, the mechanical device could be a third and the falling of the clown could be a
fourth. If these were taking as the events major, then there are four events involved in the simple
event field of "carnival goer dunks clown". If one measures the event distance between two
points, then you can think of there as being two events (for instance) between the throwing of the
ball and the falling of the clown (the hitting of the bullseye and the mechanical device's
manipulations).
"Can" and "could" were prominently used, because there can always be a matter of
debate as to what constitutes an "entire event". This idea is inherent in the above corollary For
this reason, this paper will use even distance in terms of points critical to the event chain
continuing. Generally, this will be in terms of which stages of the series of events are critical in
the sense they can kill the chain. Four was chosen above because 1) Emily may not have enough
strength to throw the ball, 2) Emily may not have had enough aim andlor something may have
interfered, 3) the mechanism might not have worked properly, and 4) something along the lines of
gravity induced falling had to occur. If there was any sort of problem with any of these factors,
the "planned event" of dunking the clown would not have come about, or at least not in the way
expected. Still, in another similar series of events, the relative factors to consider might include
more or less intermittent events due to the importance of study.
3. Event Distance and Responsibility

How does event distance effect responsibility? At greater amounts of event distance, the
qualities of Will, Cognition a d Force begin to decrease. In other words, events at a greater
distance from the Agent are less the responsibility of the Agent as the events closer in event
distance. The Agent's ability to control self is less viable when control of self has to last longer,
though understanding of self may or may not change. Furthermore, qnd more poignantly, the
larger the event field considered, the less likely the Agent is going to be able to cognize the entire
field. This means that the Agent's cognition is going to decrease in some inverse proportion with
I

the size of the event field. Agent's also lose the ability to apply Force at an increase distance. This
is because an Agent must often rely on something besides the Agent to transmit the Event. Emily
requires the ball to strike the target. It is no longer something precisely in her control, it can be
intercepted. Her aim could be off. There are numerous ways which her Force could be broken
before the Action of the striking the target takes place.
Therefore, I model looks something like this:
(at event distance,)R approximates ((qW*qC)+(qW*qF))
with (qW, qC, qF) being inversely proportional to "x".
It is a general consideration to note that event distance is a fuzzy distance, not a concrete
one. Therefore, one must take care if some sort of system of assignment is made that each degree
of event distance is pretty much similar to all others. My proposal is to place the point of new
event distance at each critical junction. At each time the possible failure of the event was entailed,
there is another event to be traversed. At each possible failure, then each of three qualities are
decreased and therefore R as a whole decreases. Eventually, you come to a point where only the
most careful of planning, the most stupid of luck or the most trustworthy of assistants could have
done any good for the Agent.

